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Introduction  
The use of box cutters and small blades by terrorists during the September 11th attacks has been 
reported widely, whereas, the use of a chemical agent—“mace, pepper spray, or some other 
irritant”—in the airplane hijackings is much less well known.[1] Rather than setting up the 
proposition that such agents are the “latest-greatest” threat, this work aims to consider the 
potential threat of improvised chemical agents for terrorist use.  
Traditional state-based chemical weapons (CW) programs share three technical characteristics 
that differ from terrorist use of chemical agents. States invest in substantial infrastructure for CW 
production and storage. This may be dedicated facilities, as was the case of the former U.S. and 
Soviet offensive programs, or dual-use facilities as seen in the covert Iraqi and Libyan state 
programs. States will also invest significantly in physical protection of their own troops and 
medical intervention in the event of exposure. Finally, traditional CW programs invest in research 
and development of munitions for open-air battlefield dispersal.  
In comparison, non-state actors have shown a propensity to improvise the dissemination method 
and the agents. The use of improvised distribution methods was observed, most notably, in the 
1990s by Japan’s quasi-religious doomsday cult, the Aum Shinrikyo, who employed syringes, 
garbage bags, and condoms to deliver classical chemical warfare agents. But, in more recent 
incidents, plots, and seizures, both the distribution methods and the agents themselves have 
been improvised.  
Improvised chemical terrorism is critically different from an improvised nuclear or mass effect 
bioterrorism attack that would likely result in more than one thousand fatalities or 10,000 
casualties. To execute an improvised chemical terrorism attack, a group or individual does not 
need sophisticated knowledge, elaborate engineering or growth requirements, nor complicated 
dissemination methods.  
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are currently a tremendous problem for U.S. troops in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and around the globe.  Over half of the U.S. fatalities in Iraq have been due to IEDs, 
typically roadside bombs. This strongly suggests that there is a significant tacit knowledge base 
for constructing these types of weapons—one guy in a Mosul garage has not been making them 
all. Incorporating chemicals into roadside bombs would not substantially change the military 
casualties; the scenario would be significantly different, however, for devices used in enclosed 
spaces like dining tents or civilian facilities.  
The path from the street chemistry of high explosives and detonators for IEDs to improvised 
chemical devices (ICDs) that incorporate commercial chemicals is very short.  Conversely, the 
path from IEDs to effectively weaponized, transgenic biological agents effectively weaponized is a 
substantial leap for states and, even more so, for terrorists.  While U.S. policy is focused on 
defending against a mass-effect bioterrorism attack, we may be missing a lower-tech threat of 
much higher probability. Rather than leaping from making bombs to producing mass quantities of 
aerosolized, genetically engineered, hyper-virulent Yersinia pestis (the bacteria responsible for 
the plague and used as part of the national terrorism preparedness exercise scenarios, TOP OFF 
2 and 3), this article examines trends toward improvising both the delivery method (munitions) 
and the agent for chemical terrorism.  
Is there substantive evidence of a shift, an “upping” of the sophistication level, to incorporate 
chemical agents into such devices? What policy responses can reduce the threat of improvised 
chemical devices? Is this shift part of a larger escalation to the use of unconventional weapons—
that is, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—by non-state actors? If such a large-scale 
escalation from IEDs to ICDs were to occur, the number of agents of concern would expand from 
approximately 50 traditional chemical warfare agents to thousands of known industrial and 
research chemicals. This analysis should be the basis for policy development regarding threat 
anticipation, threat reduction, and countermeasures to limit harm to U.S. troops deployed around 
the world and U.S. civilians at home. 
Prior Work 
A number of prominent authors have addressed the questions of terrorist desire and capability to 
pursue chemical or biological weapons.[2] Extensive analysis of terrorist incidents involving 
chemical and biological agents has been done on well-known incidents, such as the Aum 
Shinrikyo sarin “gas” attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 and the Rajneeshees salad bar 
dispersal of Salmonellatyphimurium bacteria.[3] A far smaller number of researchers have gone 
the other direction and challenged the precept that biological agents are within the technical 
capability of most terrorists.[4] At least one renowned terrorism expert has asked why terrorists 
have not escalated to fulfill the “lurid hypotheses of worst-case scenarios, almost exclusively 
involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons” and “America’s intense 
preoccupation with the threat of bioterrorism.”[5] None of the authors have considered an 
escalation to chemical weapons as an outgrowth of “street chemistry,” the chemistry involved in 
manufacturing IEDs. 
Traditional Chemical Warfare Agents with Improvised Dispersal Methods 
One type of chemical terrorism—using traditional chemical warfare agents associated with state-
based programs, but employing improvised distribution means —has received a great deal of 
attention.[6] This type of chemical terrorism may have been most infamously utilized by the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult in the mid-1990’s. Transfer of chemical weapons by those states suspected of 
operating clandestine offensive chemical weapons programs, such as North Korea—to non-state 
actors is another example. 
Aum Shinrikyo 
Aum Shinrikyo was a highly organized and well-financed group, having members with significant 
technical expertise. While the group succeeded in synthesizing sophisticated traditional nerve 
agents, they employed rudimentary delivery methods.  
In the infamous March 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system, sarin nerve agent was 
dispersed via garbage bags punctured by sharpened umbrellas. The nerve agent was 
manufactured from precursor chemicals the day before and diluted with acetonitrile. 
Approximately 600 mgs (1.3 lbs) were transferred to 11 polyethylene bags and distributed among 
five Aum Shinrikyo members. While there were only 12 fatalities associated with the subway 
attack, more than 5,000 individuals sought medical attention. More than 500 were seriously 
affected, including a few individuals whose corneas were so damaged that they had to be 
removed, resulting in permanent blindness. One small, but remarkable, lingering effect of the 
terrorist incident on the Tokyo population is the lack of garbage cans in public areas; even 10 
years later, they are still associated with the sarin attack. This incident vividly illustrates the large-
scale panic and disruption that chemical terrorism can produce in major urban areas.  
The subway incident was the Aum cult’s only foray into chemical terrorism. In the five years 
leading up to the most renowned sarin attack, Aum Shinrikyo executed at least ten separate 
attacks. Four months earlier, in December 1994, Aum Shinrikyo released 20 kgs of sarin—from a 
truck using an industrial sprayer connected to a commercial heater—in the Matsumoto prefecture. 
The late night attack killed seven people and injured an additional 144 civilians. At least two 
deaths are associated with Aum Shinrikyo’s production of limited quantities of VX nerve agent. 
Synthesized for dispersal via hypodermic syringes, the attacks specifically targeted enemies of 
the cult. VX was dribbled on the back of one former cult member’s neck in a fatal December 1994 
assault in Osaka.[7] Aum also employed an improvised apparatus at train and subway stations in 
May and July 1995 to generate the classic choking agent, hydrogen cyanide, from commercial 
sodium cyanide. 
Homegrown Terrorists 
Radical Islamists are not today’s only potential terrorists of concern, particularly with respect to 
chemical terrorism. Domestically, use of improvised chemical devices was part of the case 
against William J. Krar of Tyler, Texas.[8] An outspoken anti-government white supremacist, Krar 
was a traveling arms salesman. In January 2003, he was arrested in Tennessee during a routine 
traffic stop for handgun and drug possession. Along with conventional weapons, such as knives, 
stun guns, smoke grenades, over 250 rounds of ammunition, fuses, and hand combat items, 
Krar’s rental car contained a “syringe of an unknown substance, one white bottle with an 
unknown white substance, forty wine like bottles of unknown liquid … (and) three military style 
packaged atropine injections.”[9] A year later, after a package from Krar containing fake 
Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and United Nations (UN) 
badges was delivered to the wrong address, federal investigators uncovered a disturbing array of 
weapons in an east Texas storage space rented by Krar and his female companion, Judith Bruey . 
Krar had amassed a sizable weapons cache, including half a million rounds of ammunition, 
hundreds of explosives, illegal firearms and stockpiles of cyanide salts and strong acids.  
In his weapons armory were a number of improvised devices in varying stages of construction. 
The most complete device combined solid sodium cyanide with a strong acid to generate 440 
grams of hydrogen cyanide (HCN). This would be, hypothetically, enough to kill almost 6,500 
people based on percutaneous exposure. It could also kill half the people in a 9 x 40 x 40 foot 
enclosure in one minute.  
What did Krar’s hydrogen cyanide device look like? He had placed just under two pounds of 
sodium cyanide powder—that Krar indicated he obtained from an electro-plating company[10]—in 
an old ammo box . It was to be combined with less than a half -liter of hydrochloric acid (HCl), or 
just over 0.7 liters of nitric acid (HNO 3), to produce the hydrogen cyanide vapor . One four-liter 
bottle of acid of a standard research size used at university and research facilities—would provide 
excess acid. Alternatively, excess acid could readily be obtained from eight bottles of a popular 
commercial toilet cleaner.[11] This was a readily concealable and easily transportable contraption, 
one that could easily fit in a small suitcase or be carried in a backpack.  
Al Qaeda  
Al Qaeda’s exploits in Afghanistan, testing unspecified lethal vapors on dogs and rabbits, have 
been well-covered in the commercial media.[12] Additional evidence of and analysis on al 
Qaeda’s extensive interest in chemical warfare agents was noted in a 2005 Intelligence 
Commission report.[13] U.S. troops are reported to have recovered “trace amounts of two 
common chemicals that can be used to produce a blister agent,” most likely sulfur monochloride 
(S 2Cl 2) or thiodiglycol (S(C 2H 4OH) 2). It was also reported that al Qaeda “almost certainly” 
had obtained or produced a number of traditional choking agents, such as chlorine, hydrogen 
cyanide, and phosgene. Those chemical warfare agents represent products commercially 
available or readily synthesized with basic skills, equipment and minimal infrastructure. These are 
not complex reactions requiring sophisticated laboratory equipment, controlled power sources for 
sensitive heating or cooling, or controlled environmental conditions.  
In September 2003, the Department of Homeland Security issued an “Information Bulletin” 
alerting law enforcement and allied professionals regarding suspicions that al Qaeda intended to 
utilize an improvised method to generate hydrogen cyanide or cyanogen chloride from cyanide 
salts.[14] A primitive binary weapon for generating a choking agent, the device uses dual-purpose 
commercial chemicals, requires little or no training for assembly and operation, but does require 
some basic chemistry knowledge for initial design. 
Improvised Chemical Agents 
There is another type of potential chemical terrorism that has received almost no attention. 
Legitimate industrial or research chemicals, not traditionally associated with state-based chemical 
weapons programs, may be co-opted in order to generate improvised choking, blister, or nerve 
agents. In this case, both the agents themselves and the dispersal method are improvised.  
Using reports available in the open-source literature, there appears to be an increasing interest 
among radical Islamists in exploiting fairly sophisticated chemistry for terrorist purposes. One 
case will be examined in detail. 
Osmium Tetroxide  
March 2004 Osmium Tetroxide Plot. A March 2004 plot disrupted in Britain was intended to 
combine an industrial chemical with an improvised explosive device to generate a choking and 
blistering agent. Osmium tetroxide (OsO 4) serves legitimate functions in biological research and 
in specialized chemical industry, but its suitability as a terrorist agent—a dual-use compound—is 
limited, despite the characterizations of it generating “chemical fallout.”[15]  
GCHQ, the British electronic eavesdropping intelligence agency, learned that a group of terrorists 
were discussing the use of OsO 4 during phone calls among themselves, both within Britain and 
to Pakistan.[16] Hundreds of British anti-terrorism police tracked the group over the course of 
several months.[17] On March 30, 2004, raids were conducted at 24 locations throughout the 
London area. Authorities arrested eight British citizens—some of Pakistani origin, a Canadian, 
and a British-Algerian—who were allegedly involved in the planning stages of a terrorist attack. In 
the following week, reports emerged that these suspects, allegedly sympathetic to al Qaeda, 
were researching the potential of detonating a chemical bomb in a crowded, civilian location 
within London[18]—targeting Gatwick airport, the London subway, or other enclosed high-traffic 
areas. Fortunately, the suspects reportedly were not able to acquire the osmium tetroxide before 
being intercepted by authorities.  
Although al Qaeda has previously produced training manuals containing plans for use of choking 
agents, this is the first time osmium tetroxide has been included among the list of possible 
chemical agents. This is the first incident in the open literature in which the chemical has been 
connected with terrorism. Although this plot did not progress beyond the planning stages, the 
potential use of osmium tetroxide has raised new fears about al Qaeda’s pursuit of dual-use 
chemicals as terrorist weapons. It has also encouraged discussion about the potential lethality of 
such a substance when combined with a conventional explosive.  
Scientists were already familiar with the use and effects of OsO 4 even though those reports 
introduced the general public to the compound for the first time. OsO 4, occasionally called osmic 
acid, is a colorless to pale yellow solid at room temperature. An open canister of OsO 4 left in an 
enclosed area would be readily noticeable based on the characteristic pungent, ozone- or 
chlorine-like smell. The solid has a high vapor pressure, meaning it readily evaporates at room 
temperature. The vapor pressure of a chemical is important in determining the inhalation hazard. 
Liquids with very low vapor pressures, like VX nerve agent, do not evaporate readily and, 
therefore, are considered a much more significant threat for exposure via direct skin contact. 
Solids and liquids with no vapor pressure do not evaporate and therefore do not pose an 
inhalation hazard unless they are mechanically aerosolized.  
Physiological Effects of OsO 4 Exposure . Osmium tetroxide is highly toxic and a rapid 
oxidizer. Severe reactions may result through all routes of exposure: inhalation, ingestion, contact 
with the eyes and other mucous membranes, and contact with skin. Because of its volatility, the 
vapor hazard is usually emphasized. Very short-term contact with the vapor may generate a 
lachrymation (tear-causing) response, accompanied by coughing, headaches, and dizziness.[19] 
Lengthier exposure can cause severe chemical burns to the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract. 
Symptoms may not be noticed until several hours following exposure. This delayed-effect feature 
may make this compound attractive to terrorists as a chemical weapon. People may not realize 
the extent of the toxic effects of a compound to which they have been exposed immediately; 
rather the damage will be occurring as they continue their day. Another delayed effect as a result 
of substantial inhalation exposure is an accumulation of fluid in the lungs (edema)—eventually 
leading to “dryland-drowning.” Exposure to osmium tetroxide dissolved in water will turn the skin 
black. Painful burns or dermatitis may result depending on the concentration. It is not known, 
however, to be cancer-causing. Among the most insidious effects of osmium tetroxide is its 
capacity to cause irreversible blindness—literally turning the corneas black.[20]  
OsO 4 can be compared to traditional chemical warfare agents (see Table 1). The first 
appearance of a physiological response, also known as a threshold effect, is observed at a lower 
concentration for osmium tetroxide vapor exposure than for phosgene (CG), sulfur mustard (HD), 
or sarin nerve agent (GB). At first glance, the inhalation hazard associated with OsO 4 is 
comparable to that of the traditional asphyxiant phosgene and blister agent sulfur mustard based 
on lethal inhalation concentrations. Phosgene is a gas at ambient conditions, so all of the material 
will be available as an inhalation hazard. On the other hand, sulfur mustard is a liquid with a fairly 
low vapor pressure,[21] making it less volatile than OsO 4. This means that, in an enclosed area, 
there will be over 150 times more vapor available with OsO 4 than with sulfur mustard vapor.  
While the lethal inhalation concentration of OsO 4 is substantially larger than that for sarin, again 
the decreased volatility of the traditional warfare agent should be considered in evaluating the 
relative threat. Under similar conditions, there will be six times more OsO 4 vapor in an enclosed 
area compared to sarin vapor. The overall inhalation risk for osmium tetroxide is estimated to be 
closer to sarin nerve agent than sulfur mustard or phosgene gas. 
Legitimate Uses of OsO 4 . This substance is used primarily in the preparation of biological 
samples—a technique called fixation or fixing—to help maintain cellular and sub-cellular 
structures that would otherwise be damaged during further processing. Fixing is an important step 
in most biological applications of electron microscopy—looking at very small structures with 
electrons rather than light. OsO 4 reacts with the olefins in fatty acids and other tissues. Fixing 
has some similarities to staining used in traditional microbiology. The osmium atomic nucleus 
helps make the biological structures more easily seen under an electron microscope.  
Osmium tetroxide is also used in specialized organic chemistry reactions[22]—such as the 
synthesis of the synthetic human hormone norestradiol[23]—and industrially significant glycol 
compounds. These reactions using solid osmium tetroxide are most commonly done on a 
laboratory scale. 
Table 1: Toxicity Comparison of Osmium Tetroxide with Traditional Chemical Warfare 
Agents 
   Threshold effects 
(mg / m 3)  
LCt 50* 
(mg-min / m 3) 
LD 50** 
(mg / kg)  
Osmium Tetroxide (OsO 4)[24]  0.1 - 0.6  1316  162  
Phosgene (PG)[25]  2  3200  n/a***  
Sulfur Mustard (HD)[26]  12-500  1500  100  
Sarin (GB)[27]  2  70  24.3  
*LCt 50 is the vapor concentration that will cause death by inhalation in fifty percent of a 
population.  
** LD 50 is the liquid concentration that will cause death via exposure through the skin 
(percutaneous), in this comparison, in fifty percent of a population. Values are given in mg per kg 
of total body weight; a 150 lb human weighs approximately 68 kg.  
*** n/a = not applicable. Phosgene is a gas at ambient conditions. 
Commercial Availability . Osmium tetroxide is commercially available as either a solid or as an 
aqueous solution (less than 6% OsO 4 by weight, due to limited solubility in water). Commercial 
quantities are typically very small and prices are high. Cost for the largest, commercially available 
units from a leading U.S. chemical supplier range from $118 for 1 gram of the solid compound to 
$195 for a 25 mL ampoule containing 2.5% OsO 4 by weight, dissolved in water (0.625 grams 
OsO 4 per vial). A terrorist attempting to use OsO 4 in the creation of a chemical terrorist weapon 
would most likely be hindered by its high cost. There would also be a danger to the terrorist in 
attempting to prepare an improvised explosive device containing large quantities of the chemical 
compound.  
In packages of five grams or more, larger quantities are commercially available in which osmium 
tetroxide is bound to a polymer backbone. The polymer backbone, or support, eliminates the 
vapor hazards associated with solid OsO 4. Since immobilized OsO 4 was designed specifically 
to protect industrial workers, its utility as a weapon, even in large quantities, would be extremely 
low.  
A leading U.S. chemical supplier of OsO 4 does not take any special precautions regarding sale 
of the chemical. But because of the potential dual-use nature of many chemicals with legitimate 
industrial and research purposes, all orders are screened prior to shipment.  
Decontamination. If an OsO 4-containing solution were to be used as a chemical terrorist 
weapon, it could be decontaminated with copious amounts of any unsaturated cooking oil or dry 
milk.[28] Once a solution is black, the risk of rampant oxidation (burning) is abated. 
Viability as a Chemical Terrorism Weapon. The feasibility of using a bomb to disperse OsO 4 
is highly suspect. When heated, OsO 4 rapidly decomposes to OsO 2, which is effectively a rock. 
OsO 2 is used as a ceramic resistor in specialty electronic applications. Rather than generating 
chemical fallout, as in a dirty bomb scenario, the inhalation hazard would be destroyed with the 
bomb explosion. In addition to the difficulties and hazards faced by anyone seeking to use OsO 4 
as a dirty bomb, the effect of the compound would be minimal in an open space and it would not 
leave lasting contamination in the same manner as a radioactive bomb. Because it is such a rapid 
oxidizer, it would most likely first enhance the combustion of the materials used for the bomb. As 
an oxidizer for an improvised explosive device, OsO 4 is very expensive choice and very risky for 
the bomb assembler. Thus, its utility in the creation of a dirty bomb, when combined with 
conventional explosives, is questionable.  
Chemical terrorism incidents are not limited to those events involving explosives or incendiary 
materials. The danger and harm from OsO 4 as a chemical agent alone is substantially greater 
than as part of a dirty bomb. As a solid, the major danger comes from its inhalation. Therefore, 
OsO 4 presents the greatest hazard in an enclosed space with poor ventilation, whereas it would 
not be effective in a large, open air venue. In solution form, the major danger is via the skin 
(percutaneous) or ingestion.  
As a terrorist weapon, however, the biggest problem with osmium tetroxide is its nature as a rapid, 
indiscriminate oxidizer. OsO 4 doesn’t distinguish between membranes in the human eye and 
lungs, plants, rubber, or cooking oil. While it has the potential to inflict horrifying damage to the 
body in the form of chemical burns and blindness, it does not specifically target a critical 
physiological function as nerve agents do. A second limitation as a terrorist weapon is its volatility. 
The persistency of both sarin and VX substantially exceeds that of OsO 4.  
OsO 4, although unquestionably a lethal compound, is not estimated to be a viable dirty bomb 
hazard as it will readily decompose if utilized with explosives. In comparison to traditional 
chemical warfare agents, OsO 4 has similarities to the choking agents: high volatility and 
targeting of the respiratory system. It resembles the blister agents, like sulfur mustard, in that it 
attacks the eyes, burns the skin (by a different molecular mechanism than sulfur mustard), and 
has some delayed effects. Unlike sulfur mustard, however, the blindness from OsO 4 vapor 
exposure is permanent. Because of its high volatility in combination with its high toxicity, the 
inhalation risk of OsO 4 vapor verges that of sarin nerve agent; but it does not target critical nerve 
connections that control the cardiovascular and respiratory systems as the nerve agents do. 
Additionally, the persistency of osmium tetroxide vapor is low in comparison with the nerve 
agents and sulfur mustard.  
The incorporation of osmium tetroxide, a fairly obscure inorganic compound, into terrorist training 
manuals, suggests some familiarization with advanced undergraduate level chemistry. The British 
terrorist suspects recognized the deleterious health effects, but their plan to incorporate OsO 4 
into a conventional explosives bomb showed a lack of sophisticated and detailed understanding 
of inorganic chemistry. Their level of knowledge might be indicative of a member who is a 
graduate-level individual or a technician. Either one could be in a research lab or industrial 
biochemistry, molecular biology, or biomedical engineering laboratory and have access to OsO 4. 
The plot does not point to people with graduate-level experience in synthetic chemistry or 
significant experience in an industrial setting. This incident may also hint at an escalating terrorist 
interest in pursuing non-traditional chemicals as improvised weapons. Put concisely, in a 
chemical weapon incident, one cannot assume just chemists are involved; similarly in a biological 
weapon incident, one cannot assume just biologists are involved. One is more likely to obtain 
skills for dissemination of biological agents from experience and expertise in polymer science, 
materials engineering, or chemical engineering rather than from modern molecular biology.  
Hydrazoic Acid 
Another example of an improvised chemical weapon is the reported interest in hydrazoic acid (HN 
3)—a toxic gas generated when from solid sodium azide (NaN 3) is combined with an aqueous 
oxidizer. Large amounts of the chemical compound were recovered from two Islamist terrorist 
groups with ties to al Qaeda—the Jemaah Islamiah in Malaysia and Indonesia[29] and part of the 
April 2004 plot discovered in Jordan linked to Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.[30] Malaysian police 
confiscated an unspecified amount of sodium azide as part of a cache of explosive chemicals 
outside of Kuala Lumpur that they linked to Jemaah Islamiah, the terrorists responsible for the 
October 2002 Bali bombing. There is some dispute as to whether the cache of material seized in 
April was intended for a chemical bomb or a conventional explosion.  
Sodium azide (NaN 3) is a thermodynamically unstable, but kinetically inert, chemical that 
generates nitrogen gas (N 2) when heated. It is used commercially in automotive airbags and has 
legitimate use as a fungicide and pesticide. The compound has also long been used to generate 
shock-sensitive detonators. The addition of an acid yields hydrazoic acid, a poisonous gas more 
lethal than the traditional blood agent, hydrogen cyanide. It is also a lethal chemical when 
ingested and has previously been used in criminal homicides and suicide, particularly in 
Japan.[31] 
Iraqi Insurgents 
Reportedly the Al-Abud network in Iraq has shown interest in chemical weapons.[32] The Jaysh 
Muhammed (JM) formed the Al-Abud network in late 2003 in response to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. Initial attempts to produce traditional agents were unsuccessful, so the terrorists shifted 
to improvised agents. They recruited an “inexperienced Baghdad chemist” to attempt to produce 
two traditional chemical warfare agents—the nerve agent tabun and the vesicant nitrogen 
mustard. Precursors were obtained from “chemical suk district” and “farmers” who looted state 
companies. After initial, unsuccessful attempts, the terrorist network shifted emphasis to the 
production of “napalm” and sodium fluoride acetate with which to fill conventional mortars 
obtained from JM contacts. The specific composition of the “napalm” is not provided. 
Related Potential Terrorist Threats 
There are two additional types of improvised chemical terrorism that have not been addressed 
directly in this study. The first is deliberate attack on an industrial chemical facility as a means to 
cause either mass effect terrorism—release of toxic vapor—or the destruction of a nation’s critical 
infrastructure.[33] The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India in December 1984 is illustrative of 
the catastrophic scale that is possible from mass-effect terrorism. There were more than 3,800 
fatalities from the initial release of methyl isocyanate in that accident, and it is estimated that 
200,000+ were affected during the ensuing 20 years. Attacks may also involve targeting 
commercial infrastructure as a means of economic terrorism or to disrupt the critical infrastructure 
of the nation.[34]  
According to the U.S. Army Surgeon General’s Office, the worst-case scenario for a terrorist 
attack on a domestic, industrial chemical facility is “up to 2.4 million people killed or injured—
close to the number estimated by chemical companies themselves,” as calculated by the U.S. 
Army Surgeon General’s Office.[35] More than 15,000 facilities throughout the U.S. produce, 
store, and transport industrial chemicals in substantial quantities.[36] In 1996, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined “a worst-case release” could endanger more 
than one million people located near any one of its 123 identified facilities.[37] More recent 
assessments assert that, “at present, about 600 facilities could potentially threaten between 
100,000 and a million people … [Another] 2,000 facilities could potentially threaten between 
10,000 and 100,000 people.”[38] The numbers are staggering.  
A speaker at an industry-sponsored Chemical Security Summit surmised, “You’ve heard about 
sarin and other chemical weapons in the news. But it’s far easier to attack a rail car full of toxic 
industrial chemicals than it is to compromise the security of a military base and obtain these 
materials.”[39] Attacks on industrial chemical facilities may be seen as one element of the greater 
shift in chemical warfare from the state-based chemical weapons programs toward improvised 
agents, munitions, and methods for terrorism.  
The second additional type of improvised chemical terrorism involves unsecured or under-
secured traditional chemical warfare agents and munitions. The principal hazards of this sort are 
the stockpiles of former Soviet Union,[40] although there are several others. Alleged chemical 
proliferator states, such as Pakistan and North Korea, are suspected of a willingness to sell to 
terrorists. Insurgents have reportedly threatened use of looted Iraqi chemical munitions against 
U.S. troops.[41] Recovery of abandoned or sea-dumped chemical munitions may pose an 
extreme threat. And, even while highly secure, the destruction of the remaining U.S. chemical 
weapons stockpiles is being accelerated since these sites are considered potential terrorist 
targets following the September 2001 terrorist attacks. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The path from street chemistry IEDs to improvised chemical devices is very short. There are two 
divergent concerns: 1) traditional CW agents dispersed via improvised methods, and 2) 
improvised agents and delivery methods. Although Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo mimicked a small-
scale version of state-based programs, it is not the only model—and may not be the best model—
for urban chemical terrorism. Lone individuals or small groups may improvise more. Large 
quantities and extensive facilities are not required for urban chemical terrorism. Within the global 
Salafist jihad, there is evidence to suggest an increasing interest in exploiting fairly sophisticated 
chemistry for terrorist purposes.  
Chemical terrorism is likely to be a crime of opportunity for those familiar with chemistry and 
having access to chemicals. Controlling the materials for use as improvised chemical agents is 
not a trivial issue, requiring the list of agents of concern to be expanded from the approximately 
50 associated with traditional CW to thousands of known commercial chemicals. Former 
Secretary of the Navy, Richard Danzig, has written on what he calls the “reload” phenomenon: 
“Our national power to manage the consequences of repeated biological attacks could be 
exhausted while the terrorist ability to reload remains intact.”[42] With ICDs, the “reload” factor—
the potential to repeat an attack, multiple times—is equivalent to or higher than that for biological 
terrorism given the ubiquitous dispersion of chemical compounds throughout the industrialized 
world.  
Perhaps basic knowledge and materials are too globally widespread to justify efforts to control the 
capability of terrorists to co-opt them for malfeasant uses.  Unlike the stocks of fissile material 
from the Cold War that can be secured, materials for bioterrorism—with some exceptions—are 
widespread and unsecured  
Leaping from this threat assessment directly to recommendations for governmental or individual 
action is not something I want to advocate.  Rather this threat assessment needs to be 
considered as part of a broader, comprehensive assessment of terrorist weapons and terrorist 
targets, which should contribute to policy decisions about funding for research, countermeasures 
and emergency response. It is a piece of a much wider puzzle, not a ‘turf war.’ While the 
probability of attack employing ICDs is high, the potential consequence of an improvised nuclear 
or mass-effect bioterrorism event is much higher. This type of threat assessment needs to be 
integrated with robust technical evaluations of the risks of bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism and 
radiological terrorism.  Threat assessments also should be integrated into the dialogue of those 
involved in emergency response, as well as those involved in the experimental laboratory 
research that may have implications for homeland defense and international security.  
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